Bangladesh-Pakistan Relations Shift : The Strengthening Ties Between Bangladesh and Pakistan: Consequences for India

New Delhi, Feb 2 (NationPress) The recent arrival of four senior ISI officials, including the Director General of Analysis Maj Gen Shahid Amin Afsar, in Dhaka on January 21 signifies a notable transformation in Bangladesh-Pakistan relations. The two countries, which have been historically distanced since the 1971 Liberation War—wherein Pakistani forces are accused of massacring nearly three million people and violating 200,000 Bengali women—are now showing signs of rapprochement. This evolving diplomatic climate follows Bangladesh's political upheaval after the sudden ousting of Sheikh Hasina in August 2024, instigated by a student-led mass uprising. Her removal has disrupted regional power dynamics, especially concerning India, which previously enjoyed a robust strategic alliance with Hasina's administration. The increasing engagement between Pakistan and Bangladesh now poses a challenge to India's regional influence.

Shortly before the ISI delegation's visit to Dhaka, a military contingent from Bangladesh, led by Lt Gen SM Kamrul Hasan, the Principal Staff Officer of the Armed Forces Division, traveled to Rawalpindi—the core of Pakistan’s military operations—from January 13 to 18. The delegation conferred with the heads of the Pakistani army, navy, and air force, emphasizing a growing military dialogue. The Pakistani military’s media division, Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), described the two nations as “brotherly,” highlighting their determination against “external influences.” This statement signifies Pakistan's perspective of its strengthening ties with Bangladesh as a strategic counterbalance in the region, which would be concerning for New Delhi.

Bangladesh’s interim government, under Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus, has initiated significant measures to cultivate closer ties with Pakistan. In November 2024, a landmark direct maritime route between Karachi and Chittagong was launched—the first since Bangladesh’s independence. Previously, Pakistani goods had to be redirected through third-party ports in Sri Lanka, Singapore, or Malaysia, causing logistical delays and heightened costs. Another pivotal action occurred in September 2024 when Bangladesh abolished the mandate for a 100 percent physical inspection of goods imported from Pakistan, citing its adverse effects on trade efficiency. These initiatives reflect a strong desire from both nations to improve commercial relations, which have historically been limited.

On the diplomatic front, interactions between the leadership of both countries have become frequent and purposeful. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif met Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus on two notable occasions—first at the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2024, and again during the D-8 summit in Cairo in December. Both leaders expressed a commitment to enhancing economic cooperation, cultural exchanges, and strategies to address the dengue crisis, a pressing health issue for both nations. Yunus also advocated for resolving long-standing disputes stemming from the 1971 conflict, stressing the necessity to settle these matters “once and for all, for future generations.” In response, Shehbaz Sharif assured that Pakistan would seek ways to tackle these historical grievances.

From India’s vantage point, the warming ties between Pakistan and Bangladesh raise alarms. Bangladesh has been India's closest ally in South Asia, sharing extensive economic connections—being India's largest trading partner in the region—and playing a vital role in regional security. Given its proximity to India’s northeastern states, Bangladesh’s cooperation has been crucial in controlling insurgencies. During the 1990s and 2000s, various anti-India militant factions found refuge in Bangladesh, exploiting its porous 4,000-km border for arms smuggling and insurgent recruitment. Sheikh Hasina’s administration had effectively suppressed these elements, earning India's trust and fortifying bilateral relations. Under Hasina’s governance, Bangladesh and India also amicably resolved key conflicts, including the 2014 maritime boundary settlement and the 2015 Land Boundary Agreement.

However, with Hasina’s exit, India finds itself in a vulnerable situation. The potential for Bangladesh to adopt a more autonomous foreign policy—including rekindling ties with Pakistan—could have significant strategic repercussions. The anticipated visit of Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar to Dhaka next month, the first since 2012, is likely to be met with unease in New Delhi. Nevertheless, despite the shifting diplomatic landscape, Bangladesh remains heavily reliant on India for trade, energy, and security collaboration. Given its current political instability and economic fragility, Dhaka is unlikely to jeopardize its relationship with New Delhi completely.

Considering these recent developments, it appears that Bangladesh is prudently recalibrating its foreign policy stance. Instead of outright aligning with Pakistan, it seems to be aiming to diversify its diplomatic and trade interactions. The narrative emanating from Dhaka suggests a desire to move beyond historical grievances and cultivate pragmatic relations with Islamabad, while still preserving its strategic partnership with India. For India, this presents a diplomatic challenge—ensuring that Bangladesh remains within its sphere of influence while averting a blatant shift towards Pakistan.

The geopolitical transformations in South Asia are rapidly evolving, and Bangladesh is positioned at the center of this changing landscape. While it may endeavor to mend relations with Pakistan, the economic, historical, and security ties with India are too deeply rooted to be severed abruptly. Thus, despite the increasing interactions between Dhaka and Islamabad, Bangladesh will likely proceed with caution, ensuring it does not disrupt the regional balance while pursuing its national interests.